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PART 2
The IFC’s New Africa, 
Latin America, and 
Caribbean Fund: 
Its Worrisome Start, 
and How to Fix It
Abstract
In April 2010 the International Finance Corporation an-
nounced the creation of the African, Latin American, and 
Caribbean fund, a new co-investment vehicle funded largely 
with commitments from sovereign wealth and pension funds. 
The fund’s objective was to draw on the IFC and the World 
Bank’s strengths in emerging markets to identify and sup-
port enterprises that might not otherwise have come to the 
attention of large investors and thereby help strengthen the 
private sector and alleviate poverty in some of the world’s 
poorest countries. Unfortunately the fund has, so far, proven 
a disappointment. It has invested only in large corpora-
tions that were already well known to investors. The fund 
should return to the principles that seemed to motivate its 
creation: direct engagement with private enterprises, rather 
than politically-connected financial intermediaries; leverag-
ing the World Bank’s superior knowledge and understand-
ing of emerging markets, rather than investing in corpora-
tions listed in London or Frankfurt; and providing capital to 
small- and medium-sized enterprises that would otherwise 
not have the support needed to grow and compete nation-
ally or globally.
Patrick J. Keenan — Professor of Law, University of Illinois
Christiana Ochoa — Professor of Law, Indiana University - Bloomington
128
On April 12, 2010, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) announced 
the creation of a new fund that will make equity investments in compa-
nies in the developing world [Zoellick (2008)]. The new fund, called the 
Africa, Latin America, and Caribbean fund (or ALAC) is a vehicle through 
which sovereign wealth funds and pension funds can co-invest with the 
IFC in equity investments in emerging markets [IFC (2010a)]. The ALAC 
fund represents the fulfillment of World Bank president Robert Zoellick’s 
call for sovereign wealth funds to direct one percent of their investments 
to private enterprises in Africa [IFC (2010a)]. Zoellick argued that invest-
ments by sovereign funds, if done in partnership with the IFC, could help 
to transform the economies of many poor countries. The ALAC fund was 
not a complete fulfillment of Zoellick’s vision: he called for investments 
of approximately U.S.$1 billion in Africa alone; at its inception the ALAC 
fund had commitments of approximately U.S.$600 million, to be used in 
Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The ALAC fund is managed 
by the IFC and is a co-investment fund, meaning that it only invests in 
projects in which the IFC is also investing [IFC (2010a)]. Consequently, 
despite being smaller and less focused that Zoellick might have hoped, 
the ALAC fund is a significant new player in the emerging market equity 
game, and for this reason alone warrants some attention as it begins its 
work. It has the potential to substantially influence the nascent but im-
portant emerging market private equity industry for good or ill, depending 
on the kinds of investments it makes and the conditions associated with 
those investments. In this article, we attempt to accomplish three objec-
tives. The first is to analyze the potential for the ALAC fund to accomplish 
the IFC’s stated goals, particularly in light of the markets in which the 
fund will make its investments. Second, we review the ALAC fund’s initial 
investments and show that, despite the best intentions, the fund appears 
not to have learned from past mistakes, making it likely to repeat them. 
Finally, we conclude by proposing several reforms that, taken together, 
would increase the likelihood that the ALAC fund’s investments would 
improve the welfare of the people in countries in which it invests.
Do infusions of wealth improve welfare?
It is an article of faith among most – but certainly not all – economic de-
velopment professionals that poor countries need more wealth transfers 
to achieve economic development. Different strands of this dominant ap-
proach to development focus on transfers in the form of official devel-
opment assistance, foreign direct investment, or the sale of exploitable 
natural resources. What unites them is the faith that transferring wealth 
will improve welfare. The problem with this theory is that the evidence 
simply does not support it. To be sure, wealth transfers can improve wel-
fare. But it is not inevitable that wealth transfers will improve welfare. 
What matters more than the kind of transfer are the conditions associ-
ated with those transfers.
For wealth transfers to be effective, they must generate the incentives nec-
essary to ensure that the recipients of that wealth use it to benefit ordinary 
citizens rather than to provide support to the ruling regime or to a small 
handful of elites. Put slightly differently, wealth transfers are unlikely to be 
effective tools of development unless someone – investors, citizens, regu-
lators – has the capacity to hold accountable managers of that wealth if 
they steal, abuse, or misuse it. This accountability could come from an 
informed citizenry that votes out politicians who misuse the country’s 
resources or from investors who punish poor stewards of wealth. These 
mechanisms are not novel, but they are also not particularly relevant in 
many of the places where development has lagged. For example, it is sim-
ply not realistic to assume that the citizens of Nigeria will have the informa-
tion and governance tools necessary to punish their leaders, who have 
squandered billions of dollars of that country’s oil riches. Or for investors in 
corporations whose supply chains begin – often without the end-user’s full 
knowledge – in the squalid mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
To address these real-world problems, it is important to incorporate safe-
guards that might not be necessary in other investment contexts. Three 
principles are most important for such a fund. First, the fund should avoid, to 
the extent possible, channeling funds through governments, either directly 
or indirectly. The reason for this is to reduce opportunities for politicians to 
abuse wealth transfers for political purposes or private enrichment. Sec-
ond, the fund should facilitate direct engagement between managers and 
the targets of investments. The goal of this is to help transfer knowledge 
as wealth is transferred and to provide more direct oversight in the target 
enterprises. In practical terms, this would mean avoiding investments in in-
termediaries. Third, the fund should aim low: invest in small- and mid-sized 
enterprises. Such a strategy is inevitably less efficient than targeting large, 
well-established enterprises, but the IFC’s reason for existing, and its role 
as co-investor, is to handle such inefficiencies.
One strand of the “transfer wealth, improve welfare” approach centers on 
official development assistance. For some of the world’s most influential 
economists, this means that the governments of relatively wealthy coun-
tries should transfer more money to the governments of relatively impecu-
nious countries. Economist Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University is per-
haps the most prominent purveyor of this approach through his advocacy 
of the Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs were developed by the 
United Nations as a set of benchmarks, the achievement of which would 
indicate a significant reduction in poverty and improvement in welfare. 
For Sachs and others, the principal impediment to the achievement of the 
MDGs is “the donor shortfall in honoring specific financial commitments to 
Africa” and other countries [Sachs (2010)].The problem, in other words, is 
that rich-country governments are not transferring enough money to poor-
country governments: were these transfers to occur, then poor countries 
would be able to pull themselves out of poverty. Even among economists 
who disagree almost as a matter of course, there is agreement that devel-
opment assistance has not produced the hoped-for results. For example, 
William Easterly, a prominent skeptic of development assistance, at least 
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as it has typically been delivered, has argued that there have been virtually 
no positive effects from aid [Easterly et al. (2004)]. On this point Easterly 
agrees with David Dollar, who is much less skeptical of foreign assistance 
in general, but who also notes that aid has had very little positive effect in 
recipient countries [Burnside and Dollar (2000)]. In addition, development 
assistance has not just been less effective than intended. Just as with re-
source revenue, aid also appears to contribute to a reduction in welfare and 
an erosion of governance [Knack (2001)]. For example, foreign aid appears 
to contribute to an increase in official corruption as politicians compete for 
the control of the wealth [Alesina and Weder (2002)]. Aid dependence can 
also undermine the quality of a country’s institutions of governance and 
erode democracy [Djankov et al. (2008)]. To be sure, there are examples of 
development projects that have worked. Nonetheless, over the long term, 
foreign aid has not contributed to growth [Clemens et al. (2004)].
A second strand of the “transfer wealth, improve welfare” school centers 
on the potential for resource wealth to transform the economies of poor 
countries. Countries whose economies are heavily dependent on revenue 
from the sale of natural resources have not fared as well as countries with-
out such resource wealth. Research on the resource curse, as it is often 
labeled, has shown that many countries that are heavily dependent on rev-
enue from a single resource have weaker economies, other things equal, 
than similarly-situated countries that do not possess the valuable resource 
[Keenan and Ochoa (2009)]. The first, and still leading, article on this issue 
came from Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, who analyzed the 
role of natural resource wealth in development [Sachs and Warner (1995)]. 
Sachs and Warner used a database of 97 resource-rich countries and com-
pared each country’s growth rate to its level of resource dependence. Even 
after controlling for a number of other variables, Sachs and Warner found 
“a statistically significant, inverse, and robust association between natural 
resource intensity and growth.” [Sachs and Warner (1995)]. Although it is 
typically referred to as the “resource curse” [Auty (1993)], the phenomenon 
was initially called the “Dutch disease” [Economist (1977)], a term used 
to describe the effects on an economy resulting from the sale of natu-
ral resources [Collier (2007)]. Recent research has shown that resource-
dependent economies face a number of other ills: a possible increase in 
official corruption [Tornell and Lane (1999)], a greater likelihood of conflict 
[Aslaksen and Torvik (2006)], a misallocation of resources [Robinson and 
Torvik (2005)], longer tenure for leaders of the ruling regime [Smith (2004)], 
and reductions in various measures of social welfare.
A final strand of the “transfer wealth, improve welfare” school holds that 
it is private investment, not official development assistance, that is most 
likely to help the poorest countries grow. Investment by foreign corpora-
tions in poor countries is, of course, not new. What is new is the argument 
that private-sector investment is a surer path to economic development 
than official development assistance or the sale of natural resources. Re-
searchers have long known that foreign investment can act as a net drain 
on the wealth of developing countries [Evans (1971)]. Contrary to the typi-
cal assumptions, there is ample empirical evidence demonstrating that FDI 
often slows growth [Kosack and Tobin (2006)]. This is particularly true in 
poor countries. Interestingly, resource-rich countries may perform even 
worse with FDI as private investment can deprive them of monetary gains 
while, at the same time, diminishing their long-term potential (in the form of 
retained natural resources) for economic development [Ochoa (2008)].
To evaluate the new ALAC fund it is not sufficient to show that infusions 
of wealth can reduce welfare. It is also important to identify some of 
the reasons why this is true. One explanation is that when individuals 
perceive that there is one and only one way to become wealthy, they 
follow it to the exclusion of other options. Put another way, rent-seek-
ing amounts to “[c]utting yourself a bigger slice of the cake rather than 
making the cake bigger.” [Bishop (2004)]. When politicians in power can 
depend on revenue from the sale of a natural resource to fund their re-
gime and the institutions of government, they are relieved of the need 
to make the politically difficult choices that might support broad-based 
economic development. For example, when a regime can fund itself by 
selling natural resources, “the state has less need for taxation of the 
population, and without the pressure for taxation the state has less need 
to develop mechanisms of deep control of the citizenry.” [Isham et al. 
(2005)]. In addition, a regime can use unconditioned wealth to support 
politically useful but economically unsound investments [Kolstad et al. 
(2009)]. In Nigeria, for example, to placate its supporters, the government 
has invested heavily in manufacturing. Unfortunately, because the true 
objective of the government’s investments was political, not economic, 
those investments have contributed little to economic growth. According 
to one recent empirical study of Nigeria, “two-thirds of the investment in 
manufacturing by the government is consistently wasted.” [Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian (2003)]. When politicians manage assets with only po-
litical objectives in mind, they can make bad investment decisions. In 
perhaps the most complete account of this phenomenon, Michael Ross 
has shown that politicians in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
were motivated by the rents available from timber sales and undermined 
national and local institutions in order to exploit the timber [Ross (2001)]. 
Similarly, a recent report has demonstrated this phenomenon among 
Cambodia’s ruling elite [Global Witness (2009)].
The ALAC fund’s wobbly first steps
The ALAC fund was born of the World Bank’s best intentions and is the 
kind of investment vehicle that could, under the right circumstances, help 
to improve the lives of some of the poorest people in the world. When 
the fund was created, World Bank’s Robert Zoellick described it as an at-
tempt to harness the “significant savings pool” represented by “pension 
and sovereign funds” seeking “commercial returns and portfolio diversi-
fication.” [IFC (2010a)]. The fund is managed by the IFC’s Asset Manage-
ment Company, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the IFC. Because the 
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IFC has been slow to release detailed information about the ALAC fund, 
it is difficult to pinpoint the fund’s strategy. When the fund was created, 
the CEO of the IFC described it as part of the IFC’s overall strategy of 
providing “co-investment opportunities to sovereign and pension fund 
investors.” [IFC (2010a)]. Investors in the fund indicated that they had 
two objectives beyond earning a return and diversifying their portfolios: 
greater access to “frontier markets” and “sustainable investment oppor-
tunities.” [IFC (2010a)].
To date the ALAC fund has announced four investments, three in Africa 
and one in the Caribbean. It is, of course, difficult to draw any firm con-
clusions about the fund’s strategy based on a small number of invest-
ments made over the course of one year. But the initial decisions are not 
encouraging. Unfortunately the ALAC’s funds initial investments are not 
consistent with the principles that would make it a viable tool for accom-
plishing its dual goals: facilitating development and poverty reduction, 
and providing a return to investors. Three of the fund’s first four invest-
ments have been in financial institutions – intermediaries that are one 
step removed from the entrepreneurs whose work can actually fuel eco-
nomic growth. The fourth investment is in a German cement company 
whose work is largely in infrastructure.
Three of the ALAC fund’s first four investments have been in financial 
services companies. So far the fund has invested in Ecobank Transna-
tional, a bank with operations throughout Africa, Guaranty Trust Bank, 
a Nigerian bank, and Guardian Holdings, a Caribbean insurance com-
pany. The fourth investment is in HeidelbergCement, a German group 
with substantial operations in West Africa. None of these investments is 
the kind that is likely to promote ground-level development, avoid the risk 
of corruption or politicized decision making, and transfer knowledge and 
expertise to entrepreneurs.
One problem is the size of the fund’s investment targets. At first blush 
there is little reason to be skeptical of investments in these four enter-
prises. All are well-established players in their respective industries and 
known to the IFC and other international financial institutions. But it is 
these very qualities that give us pause. The ALAC fund’s investment 
strategy has been only hazily disclosed, but there are two likely strate-
gies. Either the fund is seeking conventional investments that are attrac-
tive to the fund for the same reasons they would be attractive to any other 
investor, or it is seeking unconventional opportunities that it has reason to 
believe can deliver a return with sufficient knowledge transfer, oversight, 
or support. Thus, if the ALAC fund chose its initial investments because 
they are strong players, well positioned to provide a solid market return 
on investment, then the fund simply put its money where many other 
investors would have been willing to put their money.
If the IFC chose its initial targets because they are attractive to the market, 
then the IFC should have left these investments to the market. This is 
particularly true of Guaranty Trust Bank, the Nigerian bank that was the 
recipient of the fund’s third investment. Guaranty Trust Bank is listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (and the Nigerian Stock Exchange), which 
should provide it with access to necessary capital. This is not to suggest 
that the fund should never invest in a listed enterprise, but such an in-
vestment clearly does not fulfill the IFC’s stated goal of using its superior 
knowledge of emerging markets to identify investment opportunities that 
other investors would fail to recognize.
The fund’s investment in HeidelbergCement is perhaps even more puz-
zling. HeidelbergCement is the fourth-largest cement company in the 
world [HeidelbergCement (2010)]. It does business worldwide and is list-
ed on the German stock exchanges. It hardly seems the kind of company 
that the IFC is uniquely positioned to recognize as a valuable investment 
target, or the kind of company that needs funds from an international 
financial institution to signal to the markets that it is a viable enterprise 
poised for growth. If the ALAC fund was actually seeking to support en-
terprises with the potential to deliver a return and deliver on the IFC’s 
development mission as well, then the fund chose the wrong targets.
A second problem is that three of the four recipients of investment are fi-
nancial intermediaries. If the ALAC fund is to be different and more effec-
tive than any other private equity investor, then it should focus on small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Most international financial institutions 
find it difficult to oversee the quantity of SME investments that would be 
necessary to have a meaningful impact on development and provide a 
market return to investors. This concern is real, but the IFC is – or ought 
to be – different. Its mission is to help alleviate poverty by promoting pri-
vate sector development. There is surely something to the conventional 
wisdom that support for regional banks can have a multiplier effect by 
helping to solidify private equity markets in new areas and signaling inter-
national confidence in markets thought to be unstable. But the IFC’s goal 
in creating the ALAC fund was to provide these benefits by taking equity 
stakes in enterprises that were not otherwise known to most investors; 
something it has so far failed to do.
A third problem with the fund’s initial investments is that it has chosen 
companies that are sufficiently large to be politically important, and that 
operate in markets that are sufficiently risky to make them need govern-
ment favor to thrive. Indeed, two of the reasons the IFC gave for choosing 
to invest in Guaranty Trust Bank in Nigeria are telling: one was to signal 
its “confidence in Nigerian banking reforms,” and another was to show 
support for the “Central Bank’s initiatives to strengthen the overall bank-
ing sector.” [IFC (2010b)]. Ecobank, another early recipient of the fund’s 
investment, was accused of complicity in the bloody wars in West Africa 
as the bank that received payments for illicit timber sales that fueled the 
war for years [Carvajal (2010), Global Witness (2009)]. Ecobank thrived 
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because it was connected to those with power, and it has a recent and 
well-publicized history as banker to warlords. Nonetheless the IFC chose 
it as one of its initial investment targets.
Conclusion: creating a fund that could make a 
difference
Putting the ALAC fund on the right path would take courage, but has the 
potential to do enormous good. The fund should return to the principles 
that seemed to animate Robert Zoellick’s initial vision for such a fund: di-
rect engagement with private enterprises, leveraging the World Bank’s su-
perior knowledge and understanding of emerging markets, and providing 
capital to small- and medium-sized enterprises that would otherwise not 
have the support needed to grow and compete nationally or globally.
The IFC exists to work with private enterprises, and does so all the time. 
But its approach to engagement with private enterprises appears to be 
indifferent to what those enterprises do. One typical argument for de-
velopment assistance and investment by international financial institu-
tions is that these investments can improve the capacity of host-country 
institutions and improve the rule of law. Our approach is different. We 
argue for direct engagement with private enterprises as a way to en-
able those enterprises to strengthen local institutions. Recent history is 
rife with examples of development assistance and foreign investment in 
large, politically-connected firms that resulted in an erosion of local insti-
tutions, not an improvement. Our approach would give local enterprises 
the wherewithal to compete in the marketplace, and thereby enhance 
the vitality of local communities and create a base for reform of local 
institutions. The ALAC fund’s initial investments are all in large, well-es-
tablished, politically-connected enterprises with little or no incentive to 
push for meaningful institutional reform.
When it created the ALAC fund, the World Bank and the IFC indicated 
that the fund would be a vehicle through which investors could earn a 
return by relying on the World Bank’s superior knowledge of emerging 
markets and its ability to work directly in some of the most challenging 
environments in the world. Such a fund would indeed have the potential 
to generate a market return and fulfill the World Bank’s poverty-alleviation 
mission. Unfortunately, that is not what the ALAC fund has done, at least 
so far. Based on its initial investments, there is nothing to indicate that 
the World Bank or the IFC have leveraged any special knowledge, expe-
rience, or understanding to identify investment opportunities that would 
not have been apparent to other investors.
The ALAC fund provided the IFC with an opportunity to strengthen its 
move toward working with small- and medium-sized enterprises. It is 
these enterprises that have the best potential to transform emerging 
economies and actually improve the welfare of local people. Once again, 
the ALAC fund has not pursued this approach. Instead it has targeted 
large, well-established enterprises that are not likely to transform local 
economies or improve the lives of local people.
Based on its track record so far the ALAC fund must be considered a 
missed opportunity. But if the fund refocused its strategy to work di-
rectly with smaller, less politically dependent enterprises, and it began to 
search for and find investment targets not known to other investors, then 
it might fulfill its potential.
References
•	 Alesina, A., and B. Weder, 2002, “Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid?” American 
Economic Review, 92, 1126-1127
•	 Aslaksen, S., and R. Torvik, 2006, “A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states,” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108, 571-585
•	 Auty, R., 1993, Sustaining development in mineral economies: the resource curse thesis, 
Routledge
•	 Bishop, M., 2004, Essential economics, Economist Books
•	 Burnside, C., and D. Dollar, 2000 “Aid, policies and growth,” American Economic Review, 90:4, 
847-868
•	 Carvajal, D., 2010, “Hunting for Liberia’s missing millions,” New York Times, May 20
•	 Clemens, M. A., S. Radelet, R. Bhavnani, 2004 “Counting chickens when they hatch: the short 
term effect of aid on growth,” Working Paper 40, Center for Global Development
•	 Collier, P., 2007, The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done 
about it, Oxford University Press
•	 Djankov, S., J. Montalvo, and M. Reynal-Querol, 2008, “The curse of aid,” Journal of Economic 
Growth, 13:3, 169-194
•	 Easterly, W., R. Levine, and D. Roodman, 2004, “Aid, policies, and growth: comment,” 
American Economic Review, 94:3, 774-780
•	 Economist, 1977, “The Dutch disease,” November 26, 82-83
•	 Evans, P. B., 1971, “National autonomy and economic development: critical perspectives on 
multinational corporations in poor countries,” 25, 675-692
•	 Global Witness 2009, Country for sale
•	 IFC, 2010a, “Azeris, Dutch, Koreans, Saudis invest in the IFC African, Latin American, and 
Caribbean fund,” Press Release
•	 IFC, 2010b, “IFC and IFC ALAC Fund invest in Guaranty Trust Bank to demonstrate confidence 
in Nigerian banking reforms,” Press Release
•	 Isham, J., M. Woolcock, L. Pritchett, G. Busby, 2005 “The varieties of resource experience: 
natural resource export structures and the political economy of the resource curse,” World Bank 
Economic Review, 19:2, 141-174
•	 Keenan, P., and C. Ochoa 2009, “The human rights potential of sovereign wealth funds,” 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, 40:4, 1151-1180
•	 Knack, S., 2001, “Aid dependence and the quality of governance: cross-country empirical 
tests,” Southern Economic Journal, 68:2, 310-329
•	 Kolstad, I., A. Wiig, and A. Williams, 2009, “Mission improbable: does petroleum-related aid 
address the resource curse?” Energy Policy, 37:3, 954-965
•	 Kosack, S., and J. Tobin, 2006, “Funding self-sustaining development: the role of aid, FDI and 
government in economic success,” International Organization, 60, 205-243
•	 Ochoa, C., 2008, “From odious debt to odious finance: avoiding the externalities of a functional 
odious debt doctrine,” Harvard Journal of International Law, 49, 109-159
•	 Robinson, J., and R. Torvik, R., 2005, “White elephants,” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 
197-210
•	 Ross, M., 1999, “The political economy of the resource curse,” World Politics, 51, 297-322
•	 Ross, M., 2001, Timber booms and institutional breakdowns in Southeast Asia, Cambridge 
University Press
•	 Sachs, J., 2010, “Millennium goals, five years to go,” International Herald Tribune, September 17
•	 Sachs, J., and A. Warner, 1995, “Natural resource abundance and economic growth,” Working 
Paper 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research
•	 Sala-i-Martin, X., and A. Subramanian, 2003, “Addressing the natural resource curse: an 
illustration from Nigeria,” Working Paper 9804, National Bureau of Economic Research
•	 Smith, B., 2004, “Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960-1999, American 
Journal of Political Science, 48:2, 232-246
•	 Tornell, A., and P. Lane, 1999, “The voracity effect,” American Economic Review, 89:1, 22-46
